Wednesday, December 08, 2010

The ethics of WikiLeaks


The Wikileaks phenomenon is intricate, but suppose we reduce its ethical evaluation to two questions: is whistleblowing ethical, even when motivated by resentment and the desire to harm its target? And is Wikileaks’ facilitation of whistleblowing ethical, even if it might put at risk innocent people? A deontologist, convinced that telling the truth and never lying is an absolute must, is likely to appreciate whistleblowing as the right thing to do, independently of the reasons behind it. And a consequentialist may support Wikileaks as a means to maximise the welfare of the largest number of people, especially if risks are minimized by censuring sensitive information. So current answers in the mass media seem to converge: Wikileaks is a good thing. I am not entirely convinced.

Confidential communication is a three-player game – sender, receiver and referent – in which sender and receiver trust each other. The receiver, not the referent, trusts and holds responsible the sender for the truth of what is communicated about the referent. The referent may know about such communication and may even easily guess its contents (imagine a letter of reference), but there is confidentiality only if the receiver, not the referent, has access to the information exchanged. Accountability is present and connects sender and receiver. Whistleblowing disrupts such a three-player game. In the new, metagame the sender is the whistleblower through Wikileaks, the whole world is the potential receiver, and the referents are the players in the previously confidential communication. This is problematic. The relation of confidentiality of the original game is shattered: the new referents are also among the new world-receiver, which now holds the old sender responsible for what is communicated, not only for its truth (if you say that the moon is made of blue cheese, that is false, if I report that you said so then what I say is true). The metagame reinstates, somewhat hypocritically, the same rules it criticises: Wikileaks, quite rightly but inconsistently, defends the anonymity and confidentiality of its sources, which are likely to make an exception about the information transparency of their own identity, frowning upon MetaWikileaks, with leaks on leaks. Finally, the relation of accountability is missing. In the metagame, the whistleblower and Wikileaks might be good-willed and well-intentioned but are not bounded by professional codes of conduct or legal requirements. So the receiver, which is also the referent, is at the mercy of the sender. Wikileaks knows this and that is why it “whitemails” the world, i.e., it blackmails it by threatening to disclose even more damaging information through its “insurance file”, should anything happens to Wikileaks or its spokesman Julian Assange.
Wikileaks itself shows that, without confidential communication, there would often be no communication at all. Thus, any argument in favour of Wikileaks to the effect that most of the information was already public or suspected anyway misses the point, which is that Wikileaks may undermine the possibility of future frank communication. Imagine an Academic Wikileaks that regularly publishes confidential information about the assessment of grants, the evaluation of book proposals, the reviewing of journal submissions, letters of reference for candidates and so forth. After the initial embarrassment, the whole system would come to a standstill.
            Finally, “information liberation” arguments are not universalisable. The new Wikileaks’ About file (retrieved 12.12.10, http://www.wikileaks.ch/about.html) holds that “publishing improves transparency, and this transparency creates a better society for all people”. Yet this is naïve at best. First, because the value of information is not absolute, but relative to its use. Judas’ kiss tells the truth about the identity of the kissed, but it hardly creates a better society. And second, because the value of the use of information is not absolute either, but relative to the goals that one is seeking to achieve, and the sort of possible world that one is trying to bring about. This is why personal details about religious and sexual orientations must be protected. Information “macht frei”, but also doubles as a necessary condition for discrimination.
            The lesson is simple: facilitating whistleblowing is morally good not absolutely, but only if the whistleblowing itself is morally good; and the latter is morally good not absolutely, but only if the specific cause it fosters is morally good. So the two conditionals call for an explicit, ethical commitment.  And Wikileaks old About file (archived 10.03.08, http://web.archive.org/web/20080314204422/www.wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:About) acknowledged this much: “Our primary interest is in exposing oppressive regimes in Asia, the former Soviet bloc, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, but we also expect to be of assistance to people of all regions who wish to reveal unethical behavior in their governments and corporations. We aim for maximum political impact.” Unfortunately, this strong and explicit ethical statement has disappeared (Wikileaks is not a Wiki, so old versions are no longer available from its website). Luckily, so far Wikileaks has picked up causes judged by most morally good. Support for Wikileaks would quickly vanish if the leaks undermined a cause such as the democratic movement in China. Yet the real ethical debate must concern the moral value of the causes supported by Wikileaks. And the concern remains: those who defend accountability should themselves be accountable. Who will blow the whistle on the whistleblowers, if their behaviour will become unethical?

Wednesday, August 18, 2010

CFP IEEE Technology and Society, special section on "green computing"

SPECIAL SECTION ON GREEN COMPUTING: Call for Papers

IEEE Technology and Society (T&S) is planning a special section on the topic of “green computing”.

The magazine has a long history with the theme of “green technology,” going back to at least 1995, when it published the article “Going Green Makes Business Sense” by Jim Lippke (T&S, Vol. 14, No. 3, 24-25). It recently published “Greening IEEE” by Patrick Meyer (T&S, Vol. 28, No. 3, 64-72).

The focus of this special section will be on environmentally sustainable computing and IT.

Dr. Luciano Floridi (University of Hertfordshire and University of Oxford, UNESCO Chair in Information and Computer Ethics) will coordinate the special section.

Submissions should be emailed to T&S’s editor-in-chief, Keith Miller (miller.keith@uis.edu), and should conform to the usual suggestions for authors (please see http://www.ieeessit.org/technology_and_society/authors.asp).

Please indicate in your email that the submission is to be considered for the special section.

Papers received by December 15, 2011 will receive first consideration for the special section.

Thursday, August 05, 2010

Wednesday, August 04, 2010

Problemata

Questions and answers about the philosophy of information.

Tuesday, August 03, 2010

The construction of personal identities online

I recently met a very bright and lively graduate, who registered with Facebook during the academic year 2003-04, when she was a student at Harvard. Her ID number is 246. Impressive. A bit like being the 246th person to land on a new continent.

In the past six years, that continent has become rather crowded, as she has been joined by 500 million active users worldwide. The round number has been reached last July. It is a good reminder of how more and more people spend an increasing amount of time “onlife”, interacting with and within an infosphere that is neither entirely virtual nor only physical. It is also a good reminder of how influential Information and Communication Technologies are becoming in shaping our personal identities.

In the philosophy of mind, there is a well-honed distinction between personal identity and self-conception, or more simply between who we are (call it our ontological self), and who we think we are (call it our epistemological self). Like many other handy distinctions, this too seems to work at its best once you drop it. Like a Wittgensteinian ladder, it helps you to reach a better perspective, as long as you don’t get stuck on it.

Of course, there is a difference between being and believing to be. But it is equally obvious that, in healthy individuals, the ontological and the epistemological selves flourish only if they support each other in a symbiotic relationship. Not only our self-conceptions should be close to who we really are. Our ontological selves are also sufficiently malleable to be significantly influenced by who we think we are, or would like to be. And such epistemological selves in turn are sufficiently ductile to be shaped by who we are told to be. Enter the social self: “[…] even in the most insignificant details of our daily life, none of us can be said to constitute a material whole, which is identical for everyone, and need only be turned up like a page in an account-book or the record of a will; our social personality is created by the thoughts of other people. […]” (Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past – Swann’s Way).

The social self is the channel through which interactive media, such as Facebook, have their deepest impact on our identities. Change the social conditions in which you live, modify the network of relations and the flows of information you enjoy, reshape the nature and scope of the constraints and affordances that regulate your presentation of yourself to the world, and your social self will be radically updated, backfeeding into your self-conception, which ends up shaping your personal identity.

To someone used to ruminate about personal identity puzzles in terms of continuity through time or possible worlds, the whole phenomenon of the construction of personal identities online (Facebook, Second Life, My Space, Webpages, Blogs, YouTube and Flickr accounts, Twitters and so forth), might seem something frivolous and distracting, unworthy of serious reflection. Yet, to many people who have never heard of Theseus’ ship, but have lived all their adult life with “online awareness”, it seems most natural to treat their personal identities as a very serious work-in-progress, and toil daily to shape and update them online. It is the hyperconscious generation, which facebooks and twitters its views and tastes, its experiences and its personal details. Nothing is too small to be left unsaid, anything can contribute to the construction of one’s own personal identity, and everything may leave a trace somewhere, including your silly pictures posted by a schoolmate years ago.

Some Jeremiahs lament that the hyperconscious, Facebook generation has lost touch with reality, that it lives in a virtual bubble, that it cannot engage with the genuine and the authentic, that it is mesmerised by the artificial and the synthetic.

I am not convinced. Partly because the genuine and the authentic tend to be highly manufactured cultural artefacts. Partly because social media like Facebook represent an unprecedented opportunity to be in charge of our social selves, to choose who the other people are whose thoughts create our social personality, to paraphrase Proust, and hence, indirectly, to determine our personal identities. Recall how the construction of the social self feedbacks into the development of the epistemological self, which then feedbacks into the moulding of the ontological self. More freedom on the social side means more freedom to shape oneself.

This is no longer the freedom of anonymity advertised by Peter Steiner’s famous cartoon (“On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog”). Those were the nineties (the carton was published in The New Yorker, July 5, 1993). Today, if you are or behave like a dog, Facebook probably knows it. Rather, it is the freedom associated with self-determination and autonomy. You can no longer lie so easily about who you are, when 500m people are watching. But you can certainly try your best to show them who you might reasonably be, or wish to become, and that will tell a different story about yourself that, in the long run, will affect who you are. Facebook is a bit like Proust’s account-book, but with you as the writer.

Thursday, July 29, 2010

Snapshot of global internet speeds revealed

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/technology-10786874

Sent from my BlackBerry® wireless device

Sunday, July 11, 2010

VC Award 2010

Received the Vice Chancellor Award 2010
"Highly commended for research supporting engagement  with business, the profession and partner organisations".

Chinese translation of The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information

The Chinese translation (2010) in two volumes of The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information (Oxford - New York: Blackwell, 2004) has been published.

BBC News - Over 5 billion mobile phone connections worldwide

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/mobile/technology/10569081.stm

Sent from my BlackBerry® wireless device